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SOME LEADING WISCONSIN EVI-
DENTIARY RULES AND SUG-
GESTIONS FOR THEIR
IMPROVEMENT
WILLIAm E. TAAY* AND SYDNEY R. MERTz4
IN RECENT years, attention has been drawn more and more to the
law of evidence by outstanding scholars in the field, who declare
that no branch of the law is in more urgent need of modernization
than the evidentiary rules that guide the conduct of a jury trial.
In the light of the abundant criticism that has been and is being
directed at the law of evidence, it is submitted that at least some of
the leading evidentiary rules governing jury trials in Wisconsin should
be critically examined in an effort to determine where improvements
can be made.1
With the above object in mind, it is not the purpose of this article
to invade the province of the numerous works on the subject. Rather,
the purpose is to examine present rules, offer constructive criticism in
their application, and to discuss certain proposals, including those by
leading authorities, for a much needed change.
TIE TREND Tow~AR IMPROVEMENT OF THE RULES OF EVIDENCE
The extensive body of doctrine known as the law of evidence was
designed to filter the testimony of witnesses, in order to aid the jury-
men inexperienced in weighing the reliability of testimony. Since the
judge is far better educated and more experienced than the jurors in
the hearing of evidence, it is supposed that he can assist the jury in
reaching a more nearly correct and just verdict by preventing the jury
from hearing that testimony thought likely to mislead or prejudice
ordinary laymen untrained in the law.
With such aim in mind, the rules of evidence have been developed
in the court and subsequently applied with results sometimes astonish-
ing to one untrained in trial technique. Thus today the examining law-
yer asks questions of the witness in rapid succession, the opposing
lawyer objects, the court swiftly sustains or overrules the objection,
* Member of the Milwaukee bar.
t Senior in the Marquette University Law School.
3-A general professional interest in this subject has been aroused by the pro-
posed. Code of Evidence of the American Law Institute. The Code was dis-
cussed at the 1941 Fall Institute of the State Bar Association of" Wisconsin,
and its effect on 'the Wisconsin decisions in various fields of evidence was
considered. See 14 BuLLrET OF THE STATE BAR AssocIATIoN OF WISCONSIN
195 (1941).
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and the examining lawyer, unperturbed, proceeds to direct a rephrased
or new question to the witness. While opposing counsel attempts to
stop testimony on the spur of the moment by objections according to
the rules of evidence that must be invoked and applied instantly, the
jury gradually hears the story of the witness drawn out bit by bit in
an atmosphere of verbal clash and conflict. It seems that not infre-
quently technical objects, sustained by the court, succeed in keeping
from the ears of the jury the most vital portions of the offered testi-
mony.
As noted in the expanded case digests and the many text works on
the subject of evidence, the passage of time has multiplied the rules of
evidence and refined them with exceptions and fine distinctions. To
use all the rules of evidence readily, to retain them in memory, and to
keep abreast with their numerous changes borders on the realm of
absolute impossibility. In most instances, therefore, closely reasoned
objections upon a point of evidence are not heard. They have given
way to the endless repetition of a few stock objections including the
familiar blanket objection, "incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial."
One of the chief arguments for the use of administrative bodies
in the field of workmen's compensation was the desirability of escap-
ing the multitudinous technical rules of evidence which served to delay
the awarding of damages to an injured or for a killed worker and his
family by affording technical grounds for appeal and reversal.
Predicated upon the proposition that the purpose of a judicial trial
is the elicitation and the determination of the truth, the question is
raised whether the technical rules of evidence originally designed as a
"shield for justice" have not in many instances become a "sword for
injustice." The problem appears to be: How can the law of evidence
be improved? Which are the useless rules that must be abolished?
Which are the rules that must be repaired? How can the rules of
evidence be redesigned as "shields for justice"?
The frequent criticism directed at the evidentiary rules by outstand-
ing scholars such as Wigmore2 and Morgan3 has attracted and influ-
enced legislators, lawyers and the courts. Today the bench, the bar and
the legislatures recognize the need for modernizing the rules of evi-
dence. The new attitude evident in the legal profession portends major
changes in the law of evidence.
Much of the discussion and criticism has centered around the fol-
lowing rules of evidence: 1) incompetency of survivor's testimony
against the representative of a deceased party, 2) dying declarations,
2 1 WIGiOR, EvIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) sec. 8a.
3 Morgan and Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50 HARV.
L. Rzv. 909 (1937); Morgan, The Code of Evidence Proposed by the Ameri-
can Law Institute, 27 A.B.A. JOURNAL 539, 587, 694, 742 (1941).
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3) opinion rule, 4) physician-patient privilege, 5) expert testimony,
6) judicial notice, 7) use of scientific evidence and the privilege against
self-incrimination, and 8) business records.
This article will discuss these rules as applied in Wisconsin, and
will consider changes which may be made in them.
1. SuRvivoR's TESTIMONY AGAINST REPRESENTATIVE OF DECEASED
OR INSANE PARTY OR AGENT IN WISCONSIN.
Although the rule disqualifying interested persons as witnesses was
abolished long ago, 4 there still remains in Wisconsin, as in the majority
of states, a relic of the former rule, namely, the prohibition against the
survivor of a transaction or communication with a deceased or insane
person or agent giving testimony against the representative or principal
of such deceased or insane person or agent.5 Under the practical opera-
tion of the rule in Wisconsin, where one man's lips are sealed by
death, the survivor's lips must be sealed by the law. In the name of
solicitude for the dead, the rule permits a claim of a plaintiff to be
defeated, perhaps, because of the failure of a judicial hearing upon
all the possible evidence.
The Wisconsin court has attempted to construe it's dead man
statute so as to exclude from its operation as many classes of wit-
4 See Wis. STAT. (1941) sec. 325.13.
5 Wis. STAT. (1941) secs. 325.16, 325.17. These sections read as follows:
"325.16. Transactions with deceased or insane persons. No party or per-
son in his own behalf or interest, and no person from, through or under
whom a party derives his interest or title, shall be examined as a witness in
respect to any transaction or communication by him personally with a de-
ceased or insane person in any civil action or proceeding, in which the
opposite party derives his title or sustains his liability to the cause of action
from,,through or under such deceased or insane person, or in any action or
proceeding in which such insane person is a party prosecuting or defending
by guardian, unless such opposite party shall first, in his own behalf, introduce
testimony of himself or some other person concerning such transaction or
communication, and then only in respect to such transaction or communication
of which testimony is so given or in respect to matters to which such testi-
mony relates. And no stockholder, officer or trustee of a corporation in its
behalf or interest, and no stockholder, officer or trustee of a corporation from,
through or under whom a party derives his or its interest or title, shall be
so examined, except as aforesaid.
"325.17. Transactions with a deceased agent. No party, and no person
from, through or under whom a party derives his interest or title, shall be
examined as a witness in respect to any transaction or communication by him
personally with an agent of the adverse party or an agent of the person from,
through or under whom such adverse party derives his interest or title, when
such agent is dead or insane, or otherwise legally incompetent as a witness
unless the opposite party shall first be examined or examine some other wit-
ness in his behalf in respect to some transaction or communication between
such agent and such other party or persons; or unless the testimony of such
agent, at any time taken, be first read or given in evidence by the opposite
party; and then, in either case respectively, only in respect to such transaction
or communication of which testimony is so given or to the matters to which
such testimony relates."
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nesses as possible,6 apparently feeling that the statutes regarding the
competency of witnesses are intended to extend and liberalize the
rules of the common law and not to restrict them.7 Yet numerous
cases appear in the Wisconsin decisions which seem to the writers to
show that the dead man statute hinders justice.8 Two recent cases are
sufficiently illustrative of the operation of the rule in Wisconsin.
In the case of Waters v. Markham,9 an action was brought to
recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff as a
result of the overturning of an automobile in which she was riding as
a guest, and which was owned and operated by a person deceased at
the time of the trial. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that under
section 325.16 of the Wisconsin statutes, plaintiff guest was incompe-
tent to testify as to her protests against fast driving made by her
to the deceased host just prior to the accident. The testimony of the
plaintiff was most important in proving liability under the facts of
the case.
In the case of Markgraf v. Columbia Bank of Lodi,10 an action
was commenced against the defendant bank for the conversion of
bonds deposited for safekeeping. In order to recover, the plaintiff was
required to prove, first, that he was the owner of the bonds in question,
and, second, that he had left the bonds with the defendant bank for
safekeeping. The trial court, over vigorous objections by the defendant
bank, received testimony of the plaintiff in regard to the purchase of
the bonds from the deceased cashier and agent of the defendant bank,
and testimony in regard to the leaving of the bonds in the possession
of the cashier as an officer of the defendant bank. Following a long
line of Wisconsin cases, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that
under section 325.17 of the Wisconsin statutes, the plaintiff was an in-
competent witness as to any transactions with the deceased cashier,
and that the reception of his testimony pertaining thereto was preju-
dicial error. The court declared that the clear provisions of section
325.17 could not be disregarded.
Most states have enacted laws similar to the Wisconsin dead man
statute, and all have been the object of lengthy discussion and criti-
cism by legal scholars, professors, authorities and the American Bar
6 See Nelson v. Ziegler, 196 Wis. 426, 220 N.W. 194 (1928); Seligman v.
Hammond, 205 Wis. 199, 236 N.W. 115 (1931); Krantz v. Krantz, 211 Wis.
249, 248 N.W. 155 (1933); Bump v. Voights, 212 Wis. 256, 249 N.W. 508(1933).
7Young, The Dead Man's Statute, 14 BULLETIN OF THE STATE BAR AssocIATIoN
OF WiscoNsiN 197 (1941).
s See Gulbrandsen v. Chaseburg State Bank, 236 Wis. 391, 295 N.W. 729 (1941);
Hagen v. McDermott, 134 Wis. 490, 115 N.W. 138 (1908); Allen-Bradley
Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 112 F. (2d) 333 (C.C.A. 7th, 1940).
9 204 Wis. 332, 235 N.W. 797 (1931).
10203 Wis. 429, 233 N.W. 782 (1931).
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Association." The last few years have seen a wealth of material, all
seeking to overthrow this ancient and long outmoded rule, and to
replace it by one which is feasible and yet more promotive of justice.
All have questioned the wisdom of the rule and the purpose behind
it. All have agreed that the highly technical details of the rule bear
no relation to the safeguarding of justice, but, in practical effect, serve
to block honest claims.
For example, one writer, in discussing the typical dead man
statute, presents the following objections to it.'12 The statute assumes
that the majority of claims would be undoubtedly false; an obvious
reflection upon the presumption of honesty and truthfulness of the
human race. The legislature has forgotten: "first, even assuming all
people would lie in order to get something out of the estate of one
who had died, at least many of them would not have to lie because
they would have a true story to be told; second, the assumption that
all people or that the majority of people are proverbial liars is con-
trary to human experience and a terrific indictment of our civilization;
and third, even among those who would falsify the statute presupposes
the inability of lawyers to expose to the court and jury the falsity and
corruption of enough of them to take chances by permitting all wit-
nesses to testify."'13 The assumption that many claims would be estab-
lished by perjured testimony is "to place an extremely low estimate
on human nature and a very high estimate on human ingenuity and
adroitness."'1 4
If the statute is to protect against the admission of testimony
which is false but cannot be contradicted because the adverse party is
deceased, it seems that the statute does not accomplish its purpose,
because the perjured testimony it seeks to prevent may be established
by other means. Ample opportunity is left to a claimant, if prone to
commit perjury, to testify to matters not within the scope of the
exclusion and still sufficient to establish his claim.'3 Thus honest
claims are barred by the statute while "the unscrupulous can circum-
vent the statute by perjured testimony."'"
" See Ladd, The Dead Man Statute: Some Further Observations and a Legisla-
tive Proposal, 26 IA. L. REv. 207 (1941) ; Morgan, Chaffee, Jr., Gifford, Hin-
ton, Hough, Johnston, Sunderland, Wigmore, The Law of Evidence, Sone
Proposals for Its Reform, Ch. III (1927, YALE UNIV. PREss) Morgan, The
Code of Evidence Proposed by the American Law Institute, 27. A.B.A.
JOURNAL 587 (1941) ; Morgan, Some Observations Concerning a Model Code
of Evidence, 89 U. oF PA. L. REv. 145 (1940); Reports of the Section of Judi-
Scial Administration, A.B.A., p, 73 (1938); Wickhen, Series of Lectures onParticular Phases of the Law of Evidence (presented before the Dane County
"Bar: Association) (1940), discussed in Lecture No. 6, p. 80, particularly at p.'97.
12 Ladd, supra, note 11 .. .I bid., p. 225. OF .A - L . ""SSupra, note 7, p. 198. . ..2 See Ladd, supra, note 11. -- -
16Supra, note 7, p. 198.
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That justice would be promoted without the "dead man rule"
seems to be borne out by Connecticut experience. In that state, the
statutes permit a survivor to testify as to any transaction or com-
munication with a deceased or insane person, and also admits into
evidence any declaration or memorandum of the deceased or insane
person. 17 In an effort to determine the operation of the permissive
rule and the results achieved under it, a questionnaire was sent to
three hundred judges and lawyers of the Connecticut profession who
were asked whether in the experience of the bench and bar the Con-
necticut statute caused injustice or aided in the determination of the
truth and the promotion of justice.' s Two hundred answers, carefully
classified as to length and scope of experience with the statute, showed
that the following groups, in the percentages stated, felt that statute
promoted rather than deterred justice:
1) Higher court judges-89%. 2) Lawyers with some experi-
ence-60%. 3) Lawyers with experience in six or more cases-84.5%.
The results of the Connecticut poll should be sufficient to quiet
the fears of those who may believe that any change in the general rule
would be detrimental.
From the foregoing, it seems apparent that a change in the dead
man statute in Wisconsin would be beneficial. There undoubtedly are
many ways in which this change might be achieved. Three solutions,
which typify the proposals offered by writers on the question, will be
considered.
a) One method would be to repeal sections 325.16 and 325.17 of
the Wisconsin statutes. It would seem that in the absence of these
sections, a survivor who is either a party to the action or a witness
not a party would not be disqualified from testifying as to transactions
or communications with a deceased or insane person despite his inter-
est, since the present disqualification appears to be wholly a creation
of statute. 19 The testimony would then be allowed under section 325.13
of the Wisconsin statutes. This is the section removing the general
common law disqualification of parties and interested persons. Oppos-
ing counsel could, of course, introduce evidence of any interest of the
witness in, or connection with, the action for the purpose of affecting
the credibility of the witness.2 0 The jury would then be permitted to
exercise its province of deciding as to the weight of the testimony and
credibility of the witness.
This proposal has the obvious merit of simplicity. Some may
feel, however, that it is too radical a change in that no adequate safe-
"7Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930) sec. 5608.
is Morgan, Chaffee, Jr., etc., op. cit., note 11.
10 See 1 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE (16th ed.) 493, sec. 333b; 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
(2d ed.) 1004, sec. 578.
2o WIS. STAT. (1941) sec. 325.13(1).
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guards against false claims, such as are attempted in the following
proposals, are kept. There may also be difficulty under this proposal
in meeting objections to the evidence under the hearsay rule.
b) A second method of changing the dead man statute was
approved in 1938 by the Committee on Improvements in the Law of
Evidence of the American Bar Association. This committee recom-
mended a statute reading as follows:
"No person shall be disqualified as a witness in any action, suit
or proceeding by reason of his interest in the event of the same as a
party or otherwise.
"In actions, suits or proceedings by or against the representatives of
deceased persons, including proceedings for the probate of wills, any
statement of the deceased, whether oral or written, shall not be excluded
as hearsay provided that the trial judge shall first find as a fact that
the statement was made by decedent, and that it was in good faith
and on decedent's personal knowledge." 21
The proposed statute is very similar to an existing Massachusetts
statute.2 2 It seems adequately surrounded with safeguards against false
claims. However, difficulties seem likely to arise in the practical appli-
cation of the statute. In what manner and by what means is the trial
court to determine the "good faith" and "personal knowledge" of the
deceased declarant? Would the court in some instances be able even
to find, from sources other than an interested witness offering the
statement, that "the statement was made by the decedent"? If the
court depends upon the affirmative answers of the witness in regard
to the prerequisites of decedent's actual making of the statement in
good faith and that it concerned something within the decendent's
personal knowledge, the possibility of perjured testimony has not been
eliminated. And yet in many cases, the only one who may be able to
testify as to the decedent's statements is the interested witness himself.
No other witnesses may have been present when decedent made the
statement, and therefore the court would either have to be convinced
of the validity of the statement by the word of the interested witness
alone, or else reject the evidence. If the statute should be interpreted
as applying only to cases where the statements were heard by third
parties, many claims would be prevented from ever being proved.
As to such claims, the result would be practically the same under the
proposed statute as under the existing dead man rule.
It is to be noted that the suggested statute says nothing as to trans-
actions or communications with insane persons.
2163 A.B.A. Rep. 597, Appendix, Proposal No. 1 (1938).
Mass. Gen. L. (Ter. ed. 1932) c. 223, sec. 65.
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c) The American Law Institute, in its proposed Code of Evidence,
offers the following as a substitution for the dead man rule:
"Evidence of a hearsay declaration is admissible if the judge finds
that the declarant (a) is unavailable as a witness . . . "23
Of course, evidence that the "declarant" was dead or insane
would fulfill the requirement as to unavailability, and his declarations
would then qualify under the proposed rule. This rule is tempered by
proposed Rule 630: "Wherever hearsay evidence has been received,
(a) evidence of a statement or other conduct by the declarant incon-
sistent with the declaration is admissible though he had no opportunity
to deny or explain it, and (b) other evidence tending to impair or
support the credibility of the declarant is admissible as if the declarant
had been a witness." 24
Under these rules, alleged statements and transactions with de-
ceased or insane persons are admissible, and any statement or other
conduct by such persons which is inconsistent or contrary to the
declaration is also admissible. In addition, evidence to bolster or shake
the credibility of the unavailable declarant may be introduced. This
is a new feature which is not specifically covered in either of the pre-
ceding proposals, where the credibility of the witness offering the
declaration, rather than the credibility of the unavailable declarant, is
alone given consideration.
Of the three proposals considered, the writers feel that the rules of
the American Law Institute Code would be the most feasible and
efficacious. They are not open to the criticisms of the first proposal,
and do not contain the impediments to administration of the second.
In prospect, at least, they seem a decided improvement over the existing
law. The authors feel that they are worthy of adoption in Wisconsin.
2. THE DYING DECLARATION IN WISCONSIN
Under the early common law, dying declarations were admissible
in all criminal as well as in all civil cases. In Wisconsin, however, the
rule is well settled that dying declarations are admissible only in cases
of homicide where the death of the declarant is the subject of the
charge, and that such declarations are never admissible in civil actions
nor in non-homicide criminal cases.2 5
The reason generally advanced for the admission of dying declara-
tions in homicide cases is that of necessity. It is readily seen that if
the crime was committed in secret the reason given bears weight.
23 The American Law Institute, Code of Evidence, Tentative Draft No. 2 (1941),
Rule 603(a) ; see also Rules 9(a), (c), 101.
24 Ibid., Rule 630.
25 Schabo v. Wolf-Pepper Transport and Storage Co., 201 Wis. 190, 229 N.W.
549 (1930).
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In the usual case, however, the dying declaration is admitted in evi-
dence despite the fact that there were many eyewitnesses to the crime
who testified at the trial.
It is submitted that, as far as necessity is concerned, the necessity
for the use of the dying declaration in no greater in many homicide
cases than in many other criminal and civil actions. 2 Usually, the
necessity is not as great.
Professor Wigmore has consistently held to the view that the use
of dying declarations should not be confined to homicide cases.2 7 In
1914, the Supreme Court of Kansas, following the thought of Wig-
more, held that a dying declaration was admissible in a civil action.28
As is so well stated by Wigmore, "It is as of much consequence
to the cause of justice that robberies and rapes be punished and torts
and breaches of trust be redressed as that murders be detected ...
The sanction of a dying declaration is equally efficacious whether it
speaks of a murder or a robbery or a fraudulent will.1
29
The practical effect of the dying declaration rule in Wisconsin and
most states is that a person may be sent for a life term to the state
prison on the strength of a dying declaration, but that same person
would be unable to recover one cent in any civil action by the strength
of a dying declaration.
A simple statute could remedy this. It could be provided merely
that "dying declarations shall be admissible in evidence in all criminal
and civil actions." The safeguards that have grown up in the Wisconsin
decisions on the admission of dying declarations in homicide cases
would be equally applicable to such declarations in all other types of
actions under the proposed statute.
An alternate way of meeting the problem would be the adoption
of the rules of the American Law Insitute Code which have previously
been considered in connection with the dead man statute. Dying dec-
larations would be admissible hearsay under Rule 603a, because the
declarant is "unavailable as a witness." The provisions of Rule 630
as to evidence affecting the credibility of the decedent and evidence
of inconsistent statements would be applicable. To some this may seem
a better solution, in that the jury would then have an opportunity to
know of previous statements and character of the decedent, and
could decide whether they wished to believe what he said on his
28 See Wickhem, sipra, note 11, p. 50: "At least the dying declaration ought to
be just as trustworthy over the wider field as it is in the narrow homicide
field. There is just as much necessity, because it is not only important that
we punish those who commit unjustifiable homicides, but it is important that
we establish civil rights."
27 3 Wigmore, op. cit. 164, sec. 1432.
2 8 Thurston v. Fritz, 91 Kan. 468, 138 Pac. 625, Ann. Cas. 1915-D 212, 50 L.R.A.
(x.s.) 1167 (1914).
29 3 Wigmore, op. cit. 167, sec. 1436.
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deathbed. Either suggestion seems an improvement over the present
rule.
3. THE OPINION RULE IN WISCONSIN
The opinion rule is probably the most frequently invoked rule in
the entire field of the law of evidence. It prohibits the qualified lay
witness from stating any inference or conclusion drawn by him from
something he has seen or heard or otherwise learned through his sense
faculties.30 One of the reasons often given for the existence of the rule
is that to allow an ordinary witness to give his opinions or inferences
on the ultimate facts permits the witness to "usurp the function of the
jury." 31 The jury, by this testimony, is supposedly unable to form it's
own opinion, being bound and hampered by the announced opinions of
the witness. Once having heard the elements of the behavior, the jury
may draw their own conclusions as to its quality and worth. And so,
under the rule, the ordinary lay witness who has seen or heard a
material happening, and whose opinion thereon would logically seem
to be of value, is not permitted on the witness stand to tell about it in
such a manner as to state any judgment of his own.
Since the technicalities of the rule are so clearly an obstruction to
a common-sense, rational investigation of the facts in a jury trial, the
rule seems but a tool for the promotion of injustice. "When a witness
is trying to tell about what he has experienced, to attempt to compel
him to distinguish between so-called fact and opinion, is to invite
profitless quibbling," and it seems that "the modern tendency of the
courts is to encourage the witnesses to tell their stories in ordinary
language. "32
In Lectures on Legal Topics,3 3 Judge Learned Hand of New York
is quoted as saying: "No rule is subject to greater abuse. It is fre-
quently an obstacle to any intelligible account of what happens. I know
of none more baffling to a witness ... Whatever its logical justification,
it is the most annoying rule in its application that I know." The rule
overlooks the fact that the jurors are never compelled to accept the
testimony of a witness at fact value.3 4
Professor Wigmore points out that the opinion rule is not found
in the European courts, and declares that in his estimation a witness
30 Kelley v. Town of Fond du Lac, 31 Wis. 179 (1872); Benson v. Superior
Mfg. Co., 147 Wis. 20, 132 N.W. 633 (1911); Lawson, Adm'x. v. Chicago, St.
P., M. R. Co., 64 Wis. 447, 24 N.W. 618 (1885) ; Gordon v. Sullivan, 116 Wis.
543, 93 N.W. 457 (1903); Twentieth Century Co. v. Quilling, 136 Wis. 481,
117 N.W. 1007 (1908).
si See Morgan, U. of Pa. L. Rev., supra, note 11; Luehring, Testimony in Terms
of Opinion, 14 BULLETIN OF THE STATE BAR AssocIATIoN OF WISCONsiN 195,
196 (1941).
32 Morgan, U. of Pa. L. Rev., supra, note 11.
33 Reports of the Section of Judicial Administration, A.B.A., p. 75 (1938).
34 Wickhem, supra, note 11, pp. 116-7; see generally Lecture No. 8, p. 111 ff.
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should be permitted to state his opinion if he is qualified by personal
observation to do so.35
In view of the fact that a rigid cross-examination of the witness
often destroys the evidentiary value of the expressed opinion, little
harm, if any, would result from ignoring the rule. So many excep-
tions, distinctions, and refinements have been infused to avoid the
rule that it should be realized that they have become the rule.
In order to permit the ordinary witness to testify to a material
happening which he has heard or observed and to give his opinion on
on it, a statute or rule of court could be adopted in Wisconsin pro-
viding that: "Non-expert or lay witnesses may state their inferences or
conclusions in respect to facts as to which they testify, subject to crosg
examination as to the basis of such inference or conclusions."
A more detailed statute is suggested by the American Law Insti-
tute.36 It reads: "In testifying to what he has perceived an expert
witness may give his testimony in terms which include inferences and
may state all relevant inferences, whether or not embracing ultimate
issues to be decided by the jury, and an ordinary witness may be per-
mitted to do so. But this shall not be done when the judge finds that
to draw such inferences requires a special knowledge, skill, experience,
or training which the witness does not have. (2) The judge may r&
quire that a witness, before testifying in terms of inference, be first
examined concerning the data upon which the inference is founded."
This rule seems to meet the objections to the present opinion rule,
and at the same time affords judicial checks as to submitting inference
testimony to the jury, which may appeal to courts and legislators.
4. PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT PRIVILEGE IN WISCONSIN
At common law, communications between physician and patient
were not privileged.37 In 1828, New York granted the privilege by
statutory enactment, and other jurisdictions quickly adopted an iden-
tical or similar statute. Wisconsin enacted a physician-patient privilege
using the New York law a model. 8
35 4 Wigmore, op. cit. 123-5, sec. 1929.
38 Note 23, supra, Rule 501.
37 5 Wigmore, op. cit. 201, sec. 2380.
38 The present section, Wis. STAT. (1941) sec. 325.21, reads as follows: "Com-
munications to doctors. No physician or surgeon shall be permitted to dis-
close any information he may have acquired in attending any patient in a
professional character, necessary to enable him professionally to serve such
patient, except only (1) in trials for homicide when the disclosure relates
directly to the fact or immediate circumstances of the homicide, (2) in all
lunacy inquiries, (3) in actions, civil or criminal, against the physician for
malpractice, (4) with the express consent of the patient, or in case of his
death or disability, of his personal representative or other person authorized
to sue for personal injury or of the beneficiary of an insurance policy on his
life, health or physical condition."
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Based upon "public policy," the statute was designed and intended
to prevent disclosure of diseases or habits necessary for the physician
to know in order to treat the patient successfully, but which the patient
might refrain from disclosing to the physician if the latter could be
compelled to disclose them.39
The physician-patient privilege rule is rarely invoked in Wisconsin,
except in two classes of cases: 1) those involving the nature of an
insured person's health, and 2) those involving the nature of a per-
sonal injury. The odd fact concerning the privilege, however, is that
it is usually applied to protect from disclosure a physical condition
which has not been kept secret from friends and neighbors, but which
only the court and the jury must not learn.
Since the statute is in derogation of or limits the common law rule,
it has been strictly construed in its interpretation. For example, in
Prudential Life Insurance Co. of America v. Kozlowski,40 the court
held that the statute applies only to physicians and surgeons and will
not be extended beyond its letter under the doctrine of agency to dis-
qualify nurses and technicians.
As stated in the dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Owen in Maine v.
Maryland Casualty Co.,41 the judicial and legislative history of the
statute in Wisconsin discloses that the law obstructs rather than pro-
motes justice. Consequently, the Wisconsin statute has been amended
frequently and liberalized in an effort to express its true intent and
to prevent gross injustice by its letter. Even in it's amended form, the
statute has been the subject of criticism. In the Prudential Life Insur-
ance Co. case,42 the court felt that if the disclosures to the physician
or surgeon are such as not to subject the patient to shame or to affect
his reputation or social standing, there is no reason why in the interest
of truth and justice he should not be compelled to disclose them.
The physician and patient privilege statutes have been generally
criticized. "Experience shows that these statutes result in suppression
of valuable testimony for flagrantly improper purposes. There is not
a shred of evidence that they tend to improve the public health. The
evidence is overwhelming that they foster fraud in litigation over
insurance and personal injuries. ' 43 In testamentary actions where the
testator's mental condition is in issue, the privilege is frequently in-
voked. And yet "in all of these cases the medical testimony .. . is abso-
lutely needed for purposes of learning the truth. In none of them is
39 Boyle v. Northwestern Mutual Reserve Ass'n. 95 Wis. 312, 70 N.W. 351
(1897); Maine v. Maryland Casualty Co., 172 Wis. 350, 178 N.W. 749, 15
A.L.R. 1536 (1920).
40226 Wis. 641, 276 N.W. 300 (1938).
41 Supra, note 39.
42 Supra, note 40.
43 Morgan, A.B.A. Journal, supra, note 11.
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there any reason for the party to conceal the facts except to perpetrate
a fraud upon the opposing party... In none of these cases need there
be any fear that the absence of the privilege will subjectively hinder
people from consulting physicians freely ...
It is interesting to note that by a Wisconsin Supreme Court rule,
effective July 1, 1939, the trial court in a'personal injury action may
require the person claiming damages for such injuries to submit to
physical examination.45
To obviate present injustices, section 325.21, Wis. Stat, which pro-
vides the physician-patient privilege, could be either repealed in tis
entirety or amended. The American Law Institute, in its proposed Code
of Evidence, provides for no such privilege. Possibly the entire abro-
gation of the rule is too drastic. In any event, the writers feel that
this statute should be amended to limit its application, at least along
the lines suggested by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the Prudential
Life Insurance Co. case.48 Such amendment could be made by adding
the following provision to sec. 325.21, Wis. Stat.: "If, however, the
disclosures to the physician or surgeon be such as not to subject the
patient to shame or humiliation, or affect his reputation or social
standing, the court or presiding judge thereof may compel such dis-
closure if in sound discretion such is deemed necessary for the proper
administration of justice." The obvious difficulty with such an anfend-
ment is that it would tend to promote litigation as to what subjects
"the patient to shame or humiliation," or affects "his reputation or
social standing," as well as to what is "necessary for the proper
administration of justice."
5. EXPERT TESTIMONY IN WISCONSIN
There has been much discussion of the complications, futilities and
dissatisfaction associated with expert testimony.47 "Two outstanding
abuses have developed since experts have become witnesses for the
parties. First, they are in most instances merely expert advocates. The
shocking exhibitions in criminal prosecutions and in personal injury
actions need no detailed description. Second, when an expert has not
observed the data which are to serve as the foundation of his opinion,
his opinion must be hypothetical, for he cannot be permitted to decide
whether its foundation in fact exists in the particular case."1
4 s
A remedy can be brought about if it is provided that the courts and
not the adverse parties shall call a disinterested body or board of ex-
44 1 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE (16th ed.) 386, sec. 247a.
4 WIs. STAT. (1941) sec. 269.57(2) ; cf. supra, note 23, Rules 201(2) and 205.46 Supra, note 40.
4'r Se4 note 31, supra. "
48 See Morgan, A.B.A. Journal, note 11, supra.
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perts who shall study the matter in issue and then give their opinion
with their reasons independent of the results for either party. It is
provided in Wisconsin by statute that a judge may appoint experts in
a criminal case.49
Since comprehension of a technical analysis is often difficult for a
juror as well as for the court and the attorneys, presentation of expert
analysis in the clearest manner is most desirable. Thus the results of
the examination by the experts should be written out as a connected
and coherent narrative and read by the expert witness at the trial.
An expert cannot by brief testimony convey to the jury an under-
standing which has required years of study and experience for the
expert to learn. Obviously, therefore, the essentials of the results
should be stated as simply as possible. Wigmore has stated that "the
judge should be authorized to require a conference before trial between
the court expert and all other experts intended to be summoned, so as
to reconcile beforehand needless misunderstandings which give to the
jury a groundless impression of scientific uncertainty and contradic-
tion; these misunderstandings now develop through the keeping apart
of the experts and their open baiting by the opposing counsel on the
trial . . . "50
Further, the expert should be asked to state his inferences or con-
clusions-whether based upon personal observation or upon evidence
produced at the trial and seen or heard by the expert, or on his techni-
cal knowledge of the subject-without the use of the hypothetical
question. In place of the hypothetical question, the expert should be
asked on direct or cross-examination to specify the data on which his
inferences are based; the weight and the construction he has put upon
them can then be dissected and examined.
The principal objection to the hypothetical question is that it
achieves what it was supposed to remedy. Under the present system
of hypothetical examination, it is common to eliminate as far as possible
all facts which might lead to an adverse response, and so frame the
question that the answer will be the one desired. Further, instead of
assisting the jurors, the long-drawn-out hypothetical question confuses
and misleads them so that they tend to ignore the expert opinion
entirely and decide the issue upon other grounds.5
The most comprehensive suggestion which the writers have found
for the betterment of the law as to expert testimony is that proposed
by the American Law Institute.52 The rules of the Institute attempt
49 WIs. STAT. (1941) sec. 357.12, the constitutionality of which was upheld in
Jessner v. State, 202 Wis. 184, 231 N.W. 634 (1930).
50 1 Wigrnore, op. cit. 969, sec. 563.
51 See 1 Wigmore, op. cit. 1094-5, sec. 686.52 Supra, note 23, Rules 501-10. The National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws and Proceedings, after three years of study, proposed a
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to meet the objections which have been urged against expert testimony
as it is handled today. Solely because of their length, the rules will not
be set forth here seriatim. The limits of this article permit only an
overall discussion of them.
Rule 501 allows an expert to state all relevant inferences as to what
he has perceived, whether or not they embrace ultimate issues to be
decided by the jury. Checks on this are (1) the judge may prohibit
statement of inferences which require a special knowledge or training
which the witness does not have, and (2) the judge may require that
a witness be first examined concerning data on which inferences are
founded. Lay witnesses are also permitted to state opinions under this
rule. It seems that the rule provides a salutary change in the law.
Rule 502 defines an "expert witness" in terms of settled law. Rule
503 allows the judge, after hearing, to appoint expert witnesses in all
types of actions, where expert evidence is determined to be "of sub-
stantial assistance." The judge is limited in this, that if the parties agree
on the experts desired, the experts agreed upon shall be appointed.
In this way, the effect of biased experts is attempted to be lessened.
Under Rule 504, any party may still call his own experts, but only after
giving notice to adverse parties, unless the judge finds it "expedient"
to permit experts to be called without notice.
Rule 505 provides an important change in existing law. It allows
experts to make all necessary inspections and examinations as to non-
privileged matters before they testify. Before the examination may be
made, however, there must be notice to the adverse parties and an
opportunity to be heard. The expert may be required to file a verified,
written report of his examination, including his opinion. This undoubt-
edly would make for thoroughness on the part of the expert, and it
would afford adverse parties an opportunity to study the expert opin-
ion before trial. Rule 506 provides that expert reports shall be open to
inspection by any party to the action. Cross examination of experts
appointed by the judge is allowed under Rule 507. A clearer presenta-
tion of expert opinion to the jury is possible under Rule 508, wherein
,it is provided that an expert may read his report to the jury, except
as to inadmissible matters. Rule 509 provides for oral expert opin-
ions, without the hypothetical question. This would eliminate one of
the greatest difficulties with expert testimony today.
Uniform Act as to expert testimony. See Handbook of the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and Proceedings, p. 339 ff.(1937). This Act is not considered here, since it corresponds substantially to
the proposed rules of the Institute. It is interesting to note that the adoption
of the Uniform Expert Testimony Act was recommended to the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin. See Report of the Advisory Committee on Rules of
Pleading, Practice and Procedure, pp. 14-18 (June 12, 1941).
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"Section 1. Every court of this state shall take judicial notice
of the common law and statutes of every state, territory, and other
jurisdiction of the United States.
"Section 2. The court may inform itself of such laws in such
manner as it may deem proper, and the court may call upon counsel
to aid it in obtaining such information.
"Section 3. The determination of such laws shall be made by the
court and not by the jury, and shall be reviewable."
A more comprehensive code is suggested by the American Law
Institute :5
"Rule 1001. The judge shall of his own motion take judicial
notice of the common law and public statutes in force in this State,
and of such propositions of generalized knowledge as are so notorious
as not to be the subject of reasonable dispute.
"Rule 1002. The judge may of his own motion take judicial
notice of
(a) private acts and resolves of the Congress of the United States
and of the legislature of this State and duly enacted ordi-
nances and regulations of governmental divisions or agencies
of this State, and
(b) specific facts so notorious as not to be the subject of reasonable
dispute, and
(c) specific facts and propositions of generalized knowledge which
are capable of immediate and accurate demonstration by resort
to easily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy, and
(d) the common law and public statutes of every other state, ter-
ritory and jurisdiction of the United States.
"Rule 1003. The judge shall take judicial notice of each matter
specified in Rule 1002 if a party
(a) requests that judicial notice of it be taken, and
(b) furnishes the judge sufficient information to enable him prop-
erly to comply with the request, and
(c) has given each adverse party such notice, if any, as the judge
deems necessary to enable the adverse party fairly to prepare
to meet the request.
"Rule 1004. (1) The judge shall inform the parties of the tenor
of any matter to be judicially noticed by him and afford each of them
reasonable opportunity to present to him information relevant to the
propriety of taking such judicial notice or to the tenor of the matter
to be noticed.
(2) In the judge's investigation to determine the propriety of taking
judicial notice of a matter or the tenor of a matter to be judicially
noticed,
57 Note 23, supra, Rules 1001-4; see also Rules 1005-6.
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(a) no rule requiring the exclusion of relevant evidence shall apply,
but
(b) the judge may consult and use any source of pertinent infor-
mation, whether or not furnished by a party.
(3) If the information possessed by the judge, whether or not fur-
nished by the parties, fails to convince him that a matter falls clearly
within Rules 1001, 1002, or 1003, he shall decline to take judicial
notice thereof."
The writers feel that either the passage of the Uniform Law or
the adoption of the A.L.I. rules would be an improvement over the
present Wisconsin law as to judicial notice. The rules suggested by the
A.L.T. are probably more advisable. Their scope is broader in many
respects than the proposed Uniform Law. The safeguards suggested
in the rules seem advisable, both for the judge and the parties. For
example, the protection of the parties requires that the court should
give them an opportunity to be heard upon the question, as to the
content of the matter offered, and where it falls within the scope of
judicial notice. All this is covered in the A.L.I. rules.
7. USE OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE AND THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF INCRIMINATION IN WISCONSIN.
Advances in the various modern sciences have been made to such
an extent that in a greater number of court actions it is now possible
to substitute scientific determination for former guesswork and opin-
ion. In recent years, the appellate courts of this country, including the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin, have taken a progressive attitude in
passing upon the admissibility of scientific evidence. In State v.
Boh-ner,5 s the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, while holding that there
was no error in excluding the testimony of an expert concerning the
results of a lie detector test, declared that it would go a long way in
admitting expert testimony providing that the scientific principle or
discovery upon which the testimony is based has been sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field
in which it belongs.
The legal principle which protects a person against self-incrimina-
tion is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, by forty-six state con-
stitutions, including Wisconsin, and by statute in New Jersey and Iowa.
However, all authorities are agreed that to violate the privilege neces-
sitates testimonial compulsion. Hence the tendency of all modern
courts, including Wisconsin, is to receive all kinds of real evidence or
proof of physical facts which speak for themselves, such as finger-
prints, the urinalysis test, and the blood test.5"
58210 Wis. 651, 246 N.W. 314 (1933).
59 See Recent Decision, 22 Marq. L. Rev. 104 (1938).
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In an effort to relieve the Wisconsin courts of difficulties likely to
be encountered in blood-grouping tests, the Wisconsin legislature in
1935 created Sections 166.105 and 325.23 of the Statutes. Both sections
provide for obtaining blood samples and the introduction into evidence
of the results in paternity and civil cases. Since it has now been
scientifically established that certain substances in the blood are in-
herited according to Mendelian laws of heredity, it is possible by
means of a knowledge of the blood group of one parent and the child
to determine the non-paternity of the alleged parent 0  The Wisconsin
blood test statutes recognize the negative value of the tests by provid-
ing that the results of the tests are admissible in evidence only if pater-
nity can be definitely disproved.
While the Wisconsin blood test statutes refer only to civil and
paternity cases, such statutes should not be applicable only to non-
criminal cases. The privilege against self-incrimination extends no
more to the use of the blood test than to a fingerprint.
Thus, in criminal cases involving the determination of a blood
group of a specimen of blood found at the scene of a crime, or upon
the person or possessions of a suspect, as in the case where the blood
on a fender of an automobile can be that of the victim injured or killed
by a hit-and-run driver, the test is of invaluable aid and should be
available to the law enforcement authorities.
The American Law Institute has proposed a set of rules which
cover the situation.,1 The more important of the rules in the present
respect provide as follows:
"Rule 201. (2) An accused in a criminal action has no privilege to
refuse to submit his body to examination by the judge or jury or to
refuse to do any act in their presence other than to testify.
"Rule 205. No person has a privilege ... to refuse
(a) to submit his body to examination for the purpose of discov-
ering or recording his corporal features and other identifying
characteristics, or his physical or mental condition, or
(b) to furnish or to permit the taking of samples of body fluids
or substances for analysis."
8. BUSINESS RECORDS AS EVIDENCE IN WISCONSIN
At the present time, Wisconsin has three statutes dealing with the
matter of business records and entries. 2 These statutes, which are
overlapping, seem to the writers a basis of confusion rather than
clarity. The adoption by Wisconsin of any one of the three suggestions
60 F or a discussion of the blbod test, see .Note, 23 Marq. L. Rev. 126 (1939).
61 Note 23, supra, Rules 201-8.62 Wis. STAT. (1941) secs. 327.24, 327.25, 32824."
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following would seem to offer the courts a simple and practical solu-
tion for the introduction of such records into evidence by counsel.
(a) The New York statute on business records, which reads as
follows :"3 "Any writing or record, whether in the form of an entry
in a book or otherwise, made as a memorandum or record of any act,
transaction, occurrence or event shall be admissible in evidence in
proof of said act, transaction or event, if the trial judge shall find
that it was the regular course of such business to make such memo-
randum or record at the time of such act, transaction, occurrence
or event or within a reasonable time thereafter. All other circumstances
of the making of such writing or record, including lack of personal
knowledge by the entrant or maker, may be shown to affect its weight,
but they shall not affect its admissibility. The term business shall
include business, profession, occupation and call of every kind."
The New York statute solves the problem of introducing the entries
of a complicated accounting system into evidence, and is interpreted by
the New York courts in accordance with its aim. In the case of
Johnson v. Lutz,6 4 the court referring to the old shop book and regular
entry doctrine said that "the rule of evidence that was practical a cen-
tury ago had become obsolete," and that an important consideration
leading to the amendment was the fact that in the business world
credit is given to records made in the course of business by persons
who are engaged in the business upon information given them by others
who are engaged in the business as a part of their duty. In Funk v.
Mode Lora Realty," the court stated that the "very purpose of the
statute was to afford a more workable rule of evidence in the proof
of business transactions under existing business conditions."
(b) The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has proposed
a Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act.66 The essential por-
tions of this Act read as follows:
"Section 1. The term business shall include every kind of busi-
ness, profession, occupation, calling or operation of institutions,
whether carried on for profit or not.
"Section 2. A record of an act, condition or event, shall, in so
far as relevant, be competent evidence if the custodian or other quali-
fied witness testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation,
and if it was made in the regular course of events, at or near the time
of the act, condition or event, and if, in the opinion of the court,
63 New York Civil Practice Act (Cahill's Ed.) sec. 374-A.
64253 N.Y. 124, 170 N.E. 517 (1930).
65 143 Misc. 805, 260 N.Y.S. 844 (1932).
66 Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on State Laws and
Proceedings, p. 357 (1936). The adoption of the Uniform Business Records
as Evidence Act was recommended to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in the
Report of the Advisory Committee on Rules of Pleading, Practice and Pro-
cedure, pp. 21-23 (June 12, 1941).
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the sources of information, method and time of preparation were such
as to justify its admission."
(c) The American Law Institute proposes the following :'
"Rule 614. (1) A writing offered as a memorandum or record of
an act, event or condition is admissible as tending to prove the occur-
rence of the act or event or the existence of the condition if the judge
finds that it was made in the regular course of a business and that it
was the regular course of that business for one with personal knowl-
edge of such an act, event or condition to make such a memorandum or
record or to transmit information thereof to be included in such a
memorandum or record, and for the memorandum or record to be
made at or about the time of the act, event or condition or within a
reasonable time thereafter.
"(2) Evidence of the absence of a memorandum or record of an
asserted act, event or condition from the memoranda or records of a
business is admissible as tending to prove the non-occurrence of the
act or event or the non-existence of the condition in that business, if
the judge finds that it was the regular course of that business to make
such memoranda of all such acts, events, or conditions at the time
thereof or within a reasonable time thereafter, and to preserve them.
"(3) The word business as used in Paragraphs (1) and (2) in-
cludes every kind of occupation and regular organized activity, whether
conducted for profit or not."
The proposal of the American Law Institute is the most compre-
hensive. The rule allows evidence of an absence of record to be
admitted, under the findings stated in Paragraph (2), to show the non-
occurrence of the event under question. It does not require that one
with "personal knowledge" make the memorandum. It applies not
only to acts or events, but also to conditions. Being in line with modem
viewpoints on business entries, it seems the most advisable for adop-
tion in Wisconsin.
CONCLUSION
This article, by considering only a few of the many rules in the
field of evidence, has attempted to focus attention upon some of the
shortcomings which exist in Wisconsin in a most important branch
of the law. Outmoded rules continue to exist; exceptions, distinctions
and technicalities defying common understanding and practical appli-
cation have crept in. As has been pointed out, there have been myriad
suggestions for improvements of specific rules,, as well as for improve-
ment of the entire field. The proposed Code of Evidence, carefully
assembled under the direction of the American Law Institute, stands
out among the remedial proposals. It has been drafted by men eminent
67 Note 23, supra, Rule 614.
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in the field: judges, lawyers and teachers all have contributed to it.
It is not merely a group of isolated suggestions for change; it is a
code dealing with the entire field. Its adoption is being urged nation-
wide. The advantage of uniformity in the forty-eight states and the
territories need not be reiterated here. Experience with such uniform
laws on the substantive side as the Uniform Sales Act and the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law augurs well for the success of a uniform Code
of Evidence. The legal profession in Wisconsin would do well to
pioneer the adoption of a code such as is proposed by the American
Law Institute.
